and many researchers have devoted to study the properties of complex networks, such as the small-world property [4] , the scale-free property [5] , [6] , and the robustness [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Especially, the property of robustness, which measures the capability of networks in resisting the effect of failures in some part of networks, has attracted increasing attentions in recent years. In the past decade, the breakdown of many real-world networks, because of the failure of a small number of nodes or links, caused considerable economic losses. For example, on January 25, 2008 , in China, a 1000 kV power line was broken due to ten days snowing weather, and fell on a 250 kV power line which made the power grid network breakdown and a sequence of bad effects coming with. In the same year, the subprime mortgage crisis happened in Wall Street, America, also spread to the global economy. These examples tell us that networks' robustness is of great importance to guarantee the security of network systems.
Usually, a network is robust if their function is not affected by attacks to nodes or links, which can be either random or malicious. In random attacks, nodes or links will be removed with the same probability. While in malicious attacks, a widely studied way is to fail the most important nodes or links sequentially; that is, the nodes or links will be removed in decreasing order according to their importance [13] . In this paper, the malicious attacks we used are also executed in this way.
One particular class of complex networks-scale-free networks (SFNs) [1] , [5] , [6] has attracted much attention. One of the most important results about SFNs is that they are strongly tolerant against random failures, and are fragile under malicious attacks. In fact, the fragileness of SFNs under malicious attacks comes from their heavy-tailed property, causing loss of a large number of links when a hub node is crashed. The heavy loss of network links quickly makes the network be sparsely connected and then fragmented. Therefore, we focus on studying the effect of malicious attacks on SFNs in this paper. Moreover, because of the high cost of adding links to an initial network, we study the way of enhancing SFNs' robustness without changing the degree distribution and the connectivity of every single node.
To enhance a network's robustness, a suitable measure needs to be defined to evaluate how robust a network is. Such a measure can be used as the objective function in 2168-2267 c 2016 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/ redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
the optimization process. Clearly, robustness measures may lead the optimization process to find different network structures. In existing research, there are measures defined for attacks on nodes [13] , and measures defined for attacks on links [14] . Moreover, Zeng and Liu [14] showed that the networks which are robust against attacks on nodes may not be robust against attacks on links. However, in the real-world situations, different types of attacks may happen simultaneously. Thus, algorithms which can enhance the robustness of networks against multiple malicious attacks are required. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to improve SFNs' robustness so that they are robust against malicious attacks both on nodes and links. To achieve this purpose, we first use the Pearson's correlation coefficient to analyze the relationship between different measures. Based on the correlation analyses, we select the measures which are negatively correlated since such measures cannot be optimized simultaneously using any single-objective optimization methods. Then, we model the problem of optimizing network robustness against multiple malicious attacks as a multiobjective optimization problem (MOP).
Many algorithms have been proposed to improve the robustness of networks [13] , [16] [17] [18] , but these existing methods are designed for single-objective problems. Moreover, although Zeng and Liu [14] have proposed a hybrid-optimization method to improve the node-robustness and link-robustness at the same time, the algorithm they designed is still a single-objective one, and can only find one robust network at the end of the optimization process. Thus, this paper is the first one on studying network robustness against multiple malicious attacks from the viewpoint of multiobjective optimization.
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are the most popular method for solving MOPs [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . EAs are a kind of stochastic global optimization methods inspired by the biological mechanism of evolution and heredity and have been successfully used to solve various problems [33] [34] [35] . Therefore, based on the properties of the MOP we modeled, we propose a two-phase multiobjective EA (MOEA) to optimize SFNs' robustness against multiple malicious attacks (MMAs). The algorithm is labeled as MOEA-RSFMMA. In MOEA-RSFMMA, the computational cost for the two objectives are well balanced using two phases focusing on different purposes, so that the algorithm can effectively search for the optimal Pareto fronts. In the experiments, the efficiency of MOEA-RSFMMA is validated on synthetic and real-world networks. Moreover, both local and global characteristics of the networks in different parts of obtained Pareto fronts are studied. The comparison with existing algorithms is also conducted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related work, and Section III studies the correlation among robustness measures. MOEA-RSFMMA is introduced in detail in Section IV. The experiments on synthetic SFNs and real-world networks are given in Sections V and VI, respectively. Section VII gives the comparison with existing algorithms. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The research on the network robustness mainly focuses on two directions, namely designing measures which can evaluate the robustness appropriately and proposing optimization algorithms to design robust networks.
A. Related Work on Robustness Measures
The early research on robustness measures can be traced back to 1970. In 1970, Frank and Frisch [36] analyzed the survivability of networks using the basic concept of graph connectivity. However, the graph connectivity only partly reflects the ability of graphs to retain certain degree of connectedness under deletion. Thus, other improved measures were introduced, such as super connectivity [37] and conditional connectivity [38] . These improved measures consider the extent to which the network is damaged and the cost of damaging a network. However, the computational cost in calculating these measures for general graphs is very high.
Another robustness measure is the second smallest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix. Fiedler [39] showed how the magnitude of algebraic connectivity reflects the overall graph is connected. Merris [40] gave a survey of the literature on algebraic connectivity. However, the algebraic connectivity is too coarse to capture important features of structural robustness of complex networks [15] . Thus, Wu et al. [15] introduced the concept of natural connectivity, which characterizes the redundancy of alternative routes in a network by quantifying the weighed number of closed walks of all lengths. The natural connectivity can be regarded as an average eigenvalue that strictly changes monotonically with the addition or deletion of edges.
In 2000, Albert et al. [8] stimulated the study on network robustness from the viewpoint of random graph theory. To characterize the structural robustness, they proposed a statistical measure, namely the critical removal fraction of vertices (edges) for the disintegration of a network. The disintegration of network performance is measured in terms of network performance. The most common performance measurements include the diameter, the size of the largest component, the average path length, and the efficiency [41] . For some special networks, the critical removal fraction can be obtained analytically [10] , [11] , [42] , [43] .
In 2011, Schneider et al. [13] pointed out that the robust measure in terms of the critical fraction of attacks at which the system completely collapse, the percolation threshold, may not be useful in many realistic cases. These measures, for example, ignore situations in which the network suffers a significant damage, but still keeps its integrity. Thus, they proposed a unique robustness measure R, which considers the size of the largest component during all possible malicious attacks [13] . Since the original R only considers the attacks on nodes, Zeng and Liu [14] extended it to consider the attacks on links. The recent studies show that R obtain a good performance, thus, R is used to evaluate the network robustness in this paper.
B. Related Work on Optimization Algorithms for Designing Robust Networks
In terms of the optimization of network robustness, some researchers focused on theoretical analyses. Paul et al. [12] determined network design guidelines which maximize the robustness of networks to both random failures and intentional attacks while keeping the cost of the network be constant. They theoretically studied the optimal parameters for SFNs having degree distributions with a single power-law regime, networks having degree distributions with two power-law regimes, and networks described by degree distributions containing two peaks. Tanizawa et al. [44] studied the robustness of complex networks to multiple waves of simultaneous targeted and random attacks. They provided qualitative argument and numerical results which indicated that the most robust network to multiple waves of targeted and random attacks has the bimodal degree distribution.
In addition to the theoretical studies, some optimization algorithms have been proposed. Most of them are based on heuristic methods. Xiao et al. [45] proposed a simple rewiring method which does not change any nodal degree. They showed that network robustness can be steadily enhanced at a slightly decreased assortativity coefficient. Louzada et al. [16] proposed a smart rewiring strategy to modify the network topology based on the evolution of network's largest component during a sequence of targeted attacks. The experimental results showed that this algorithm has a lower computational cost, and can derive the formation of layers of nodes with similar degree while keeping a highly modular structure.
Schneider et al. [13] designed a greedy algorithm to mitigate malicious attacks by swapping the connections of two randomly chosen edges. After the swapping, if the robustness of the network is increased, the swapping is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected and another pair of edges will be selected. Following this paper, Buesser et al. [17] improved the above algorithm using simulated annealing; that is, after a pair of edges is swapped, if the robustness of the networks is decreased, the swapping can still be accepted with certain probability. The work in [13] and [17] took R as the objective function and only considered node attacks. Thus, Zeng and Liu [14] first proposed a link-robustness measure. They showed that solely enhancing the node-robustness measure cannot guarantee the improvement of link-robustness measure. In order to design robust networks that are resistant to a more realistic attack condition, they proposed a hybrid greedy algorithm that considers both node-robustness and the link-robustness.
All the above optimization algorithms just use rewiring or swapping strategies, which are equivalent to local search. Since the searching space of designing network structure is really large, and if only local search is used, the convergence speed of the algorithm is slow. Thus, in our previous work, we proposed a memetic algorithm (MA) to optimize the robustness of networks [18] . A crossover operator which can perform global search was designed. The experimental results showed that this MA combines the global and local search effectively. On the other hand, the above greedy or memetic methods all modeled the problem of optimizing network robustness as a single-objective one. Although Zeng and Liu [14] pointed out that different attacks may happen simultaneously, they still combined the node-robustness and link-robustness measures together to form one objective. Therefore, this paper presents the first study on enhancing network robustness against multiple malicious attacks from the viewpoint of multiobjective optimization.
III. ROBUSTNESS MEASURE CORRELATIONS
A network can be represented as a graph G = (V, E), where V = {1, 2, 3, . . . , N} is the set of nodes, and E = {e ij |i, j ∈ V, i = j} is the set of M links. In this paper, undirected and unweighted SFNs are considered. Synthetic SFNs with different sizes are created by the well-known Barabási-Albert model (BA model) [1] , [5] . The BA model starts with a small clique (a completely connected graph) which has N 0 nodes. At each successive time step, a new node is added and connected to M 0 different existing nodes, where M 0 is smaller than N 0 . When a new node is connected to an existing node, the probability of choosing an existing node is proportional to the degree. This high preferential attachment has been observed in many real networks such as the Internet and scientist cooperation networks [11] , [46] .
A. Multiple Malicious Attacks
Since our purpose is to improve network structures so that they are robust against multiple malicious attacks, we first introduce the multiple malicious attacks studied in this paper. Usually, attacks may happen on nodes or links. Under malicious attacks, nodes or links are attacked based on their importance. There are many measures to evaluate the importance of nodes or links, such as degree, betweenness centrality [47] , [48] , eigenvector centrality [49] , and closeness centrality [50] , [51] . Here, two most popular measures, degree and betweenness centrality, are employed, which correspond to the local and global information in a network.
In terms of degree, there are node degree and edge degree. The node degree is equal to the number of links a node connects to. The edge degree is extended from the node degree, and the method in [19] is used here. Suppose k ij is the edge degree of link e ij , then
where k i and k j are the degree of nodes i and j. Usually, the larger the value of degree is, the more important a node or a link is. In terms of betweenness centrality, there are also node betweenness centrality and edge betweenness centrality. The node betweenness centrality c BC l of node l is calculated as follows [47] : (2) where P ij represents the number of shortest paths between nodes i and j and P l ij represents the number of shortest paths between nodes i and j that pass through node l.
The edge betweenness centrality c BC (3) where P e kl ij represents the number of shortest paths between nodes i and j that pass through e kl . Being similar to degree, the larger the value of betweenness is, the more important a node or a link is.
Therefore, two types of node attacks and two types of link attacks are studied. The two types of node attacks are defined as removing the nodes with the highest node degree or the largest node betweenness centrality. All nodes are sorted decreasingly in terms of the node degree or the node betweenness centrality, and then the node with the highest degree or the largest betweenness centrality is removed. After removing a node, the degree or the betweenness centrality of remained nodes is recalculated and all left nodes are sorted again. The process continues with removing the first node of the sorted list until the network is crashed down. These two types of node attacks are labeled as high degree adaptive node attacks (NAHDA) and high betweenness centrality adaptive node attacks (NAHBCA).
The two types of link attacks are defined as removing the links with the highest edge degree or the largest edge betweenness centrality. All links are sorted decreasingly in terms of the edge degree or the edge betweenness centrality, and then the link with the highest degree or the largest betweenness centrality is removed. After removing a link, the edge degree or the edge betweenness centrality of remained links is recalculated and all left links are sorted again. The process continues with removing the first link of the sorted list until the network is crashed down. Similarly, these two types of attacks are labeled as high degree adaptive link attacks (LAHDA) and high betweenness centrality adaptive link attacks (LAHBCA).
B. Robustness Measures
The popular way to evaluate the robustness of a network is to calculate the size of the largest connected component after the network suffers from attacks. Many measures have been proposed. Schneider et al. [13] proposed the well-known measure R for node attacks
where s(Q) is the fraction of nodes in the largest connected component after removing Q = qN nodes. The normalization factor 1/N ensures that the robustness of networks with different sizes can be compared. The larger the value of R is, the more robust the network is.
Zeng and Liu [14] extended the above measure to evaluate link attacks as follows:
where s(P) is the fraction of nodes in the largest connected component after removing P = pM links. The normalization factor 1/M also ensures that the robustness of network with different sizes can be compared. The larger the value of R l is, the more robust the network is.
In the following study, we combine these two measures with the above four types of attacks to form four robustness measures, where two for node attacks, calculated according to (4) , and two for link attacks, calculated according to (5) . When networks suffer from the NAHDA, the measure is labeled as R D n , which is equivalent to R; when networks suffer from the NAHBCA, the measure is labeled as R BC n ; when networks suffer from LAHDA, the measure is labeled as R D l ; and when networks suffer from LAHBCA, the measure is labeled as R BC l , which is equivalent to R l .
C. Robustness Measure Correlations
Although all the four measures R D n , R BC n , R D l , and R BC l are based on the size of the largest connected components, they manifest different malicious attacks. Therefore, the Pearson's correlation coefficient is used to analyze the correlation between these measures. To calculate the Pearson's correlation coefficient, a set of networks need to be generated. However, if we randomly generate these networks using the BA-model, most networks have very small values in the four robustness measures. To estimate the correlation between a pair of measures, networks with both low and high robust need to be generated. Thus, we use the single-objective optimization algorithm MA-RSFMA to realize the purpose of sampling individuals with both high and low robustness, where MA-RSFMA is an MA for optimizing the robustness of SFNs proposed in our previous work [18] . The details of the method are given as follows. 1) Randomly generate an SFN G using the BA-model. 2) Let R D n be the objective function, and use MA-RSFMA to optimize the robustness of G. The number of fitness function evaluates is set to 3 × 10 4 , and after every ten fitness function evaluates, the current best network is sampled. Finally, 3000 networks are obtained. objective, and single-objective optimization algorithms can be used to optimize this combined objective to improve the network structure. However, if two measures are uncorrelated or strongly negatively correlated with each other, the multiobjective optimization algorithm is a better choice.
The conflict between R D n and R BC l is strong, and they may lead the optimization process to find totally different network structures when optimized separately. That is to say, the networks which are robust against NAHDA may be vulnerable against LAHBCA, and vice versa. If we want to design a network which is robust against both NAHDA and LAHBCA, R D n and R BC l should be optimized simultaneously. Thus, we select R D n and R BC l as two objective functions, and model the problem of finding a network which is robust against both NAHDA and LAHBCA as an MOP.
IV. MOEA-RSFMMA
In the above section, we model the problem of improving the robustness of SFNs against multiple malicious attacks as a multiobjective problem. Next, with the intrinsic properties of this problem in mind, we propose a multiobjective EA, labeled as MOEA-RSFMMA. MOEA-RSFMMA is designed to optimize the robustness of SFNs against malicious node and link attacks without changing the degree distribution and the connectivity of each single node.
Usually, the initial population of EAs is generated randomly in the searching space. However, the searching space of the network robustness optimization problem is very large, and if we generate the initial population randomly, the values of most individuals in each objective will be very low. Since, we model the problem as an MOP, we hope the individuals in the initial population have distributed values in each objective. Also, during the evolutionary process, the two objective functions, R D n and R BC l , need to be calculated for each new individual. However, the computational cost for calculating R D n and R BC l is not balance, and the cost for R BC l is much larger than that for R D n . Therefore, to be more effective, MOEA-RSFMMA is composed of two phases, the "R D n -sampling" phase and the "R D n -R BC l -optimization" phase. [54] applied the two-phase or two-stage MA to flexible job-shop scheduling problems, job shop scheduling problems [55] and traveling salesman problems [56] , respectively. However, these algorithms are not designed for optimizing the network robustness, and the purpose of each phase is also different from that of our algorithm.
A. R D
n -Sampling Phase In the population, each chromosome represents a graph, thus, a population with chromosomes represents graphs, which are labeled as G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G . Since we need to keep invariant the number of links and the degree of each node, each chromosome can be generated by randomly adjusting a fraction of edges in the initial SFN G 0 . Thus, the purpose of the R D n -sampling phase is to generate graphs with both high and low R D n from the initial graph G 0 . However, if we only randomly adjust a fraction of edges in G 0 to generate these graphs, their values of R D n will be low. Thus, being similar to calculate the Pearson's correlation coefficient, we use MA-RSFMA [18] to realize the purpose of sampling individuals with both high and low R D n . During the evolutionary process of MA-RSFMA, we record the best individual in current population at a certain interval to form the suitable initial population for the R D n -R BC l -optimization phase. The details of the R D nsampling phase are given in Algorithm 1, where the operations Population_Initialization(.), Crossover_Operator(.), and Local_Search_Operator(.) are related operations we designed in [18] .
B. R D
n -R BC l -Optimization Phase In this phase, the framework of the well-known multiobjective algorithm NSGA-II [23] is employed. The fast nondominated sort and the crowding distance assignment proposed in [23] are used to generate the next generation. In addition, the newly designed efficient crossover operator [18] is also used.
In MOEA-RSFMMA, the R D n -sampling phase is first conducted so that a good initial population is generated. Then the R D n -R BC l -optimization phase takes over the evolutionary process, and further evolves the initial population in terms of both R D n and R BC l . The details of MOEA-RSFMMA are summarized in Algorithm 2. 
V. EXPERIMENTS ON SYNTHETIC SCALE-FREE NETWORKS
In this section, synthetic SFNs with different sizes generated by the BA model [1] , [5] are set to be the initial network G 0 to validate the performance of MOEA-RSFMMA. In MOEA-RSFMMA, and are set to 10 and 100, respectively. p c , p l , and α are set to 0.5, 0.8, and 0.9, which are the same with those used in [18] . The parameter τ is determined by the number of fitness function evaluations (NFFEs) in the R D n -sampling phase and the population size in the R D n -R BC l -optimization phase; that is, τ is set to NFFE/ . All experiments are carried out on computers with 16 GB of memory and Intel core i7.
First, the Pareto fronts obtained by MOEA-RSFMMA and the network topologies extracted from the Pareto fronts are analyzed. Second, to further understand the changing of network functionality in different parts of the Pareto fronts, three representative networks are extracted from each obtained A set of networks on the Pareto front obtained; 
Sort F i in decreasing order according to the crowding distance;
Pareto front, and then the size of the largest connected components and the global communication efficiency are analyzed. Furthermore, in order to understand the global network properties in different parts of the Pareto fronts, the average shortest path length and the assortative coefficient are investigated.
A. Pareto Fronts Obtained by MOEA-RSFMMA
In Fig. 2 , the Pareto fronts obtained by MOEA-RSFMMA for networks with 100, 200, 300, and 500 nodes are reported, where N 0 = 3 and M 0 = 2. The NFFE is set to 3 × 10 4 for the R D n -sampling phase and 1 × 10 4 for the R D n -R BC loptimization phase. By using these two phases, we can balance the computational cost in calculating R D n and R BC l . The obtained Pareto fronts in Fig. 2 provide a set of networks with different topologies. In general, the networks located at the left part are more robust against link attacks, while those located at the right part are more robust against node attacks, and those in the middle compromise these two types of attacks. Thus, to further analyze the topology difference in different parts of the Pareto fronts, we extract three networks from each Pareto front, namely the one with the largest R BC l (the leftmost one), the one with the largest R D n (the rightmost one), and the one closest to the coor- 
and min(R BC l ) and max(R BC l ) are the minimum and maximum values of R BC l in each Pareto front. These three networks are labeled as G l , G r , and G m , respectively. The topologies of these networks are shown in Fig. 3 .
As can be seen, G r with 100, 200, 300, and 500 nodes have onion-like structures which are consistent with recent studies [13] . On the contrary, although G l with 100, 200, 300, and 500 nodes are also robust against LAHBCA, their topologies are almost random, which are similar to initial networks generated by the BA model. However, G m with 100, 200, 300, and 500 nodes are rather attractive because they achieve a well balance between R D n and R BC l . In practice, we often have many special requirements from the real world, so each kind of network structure obtained by MOEA-RSFMMA is useful for decision makers. Also, to show the statistical performance of MOEA-RSFMMA, ten independent runs are conducted. From each of the ten obtained Pareto fronts, G l , G r , and G m are extracted. The mean and variance of R D n and R D n of these extracted networks averaged over ten independent runs are given in Fig. 4 , which shows that the performance of MOEA-RSFMMA is stable.
B. Largest Connected Subgraph
In real-world attacks, networks will not be destroyed totally, like the calculation of robustness measures which need to simulate a series of attacks until all nodes or edges are failed. Therefore, we study the changing of the largest connected subgraphs during the process of attacks. Fig. 5 shows the (4) and s(P) in (5) of the selected networks. s(Q) as a function of q describes the decreasing of the largest connected subgraph size when the networks are attacked by NAHDA, and s(P) as a function of p describes the decreasing of the largest connected subgraph size when the networks are attacked by LAHBCA. As can be seen, for the networks with high R D n and R BC l , their largest connected subgraph sizes decrease slowly when facing NAHDA and LAHBCA, respectively. However, when the attacks are exchanged, the situations are different.
C. Global Communication Efficiency
Although the connectivity and global communication efficiency may be well protected in a connected network, the rapidly changing of global communication efficiency when the network suffers from targeted attacks is also a pivotal factor. This changing should have been considered in real-world communication and transportation networks. The communication efficiency C(G) proposed by Latora and Marchiori [41] is used here, which considers the reciprocal of shortest path between nodes i and j (6) where c ij = 1/d ij and d ij is the length of the shortest path between nodes i and j. When nodes i and j belong to different components, c ij = 0. Obviously, the larger the value of C(G) is, the better the expected communication efficiency is. The communication efficiency of G l , G m , and G r are shown in Fig. 6 . C(G) as a function of q describes the decreasing of global communication efficiency of the left network when the network is attacked by NAHDA and C(G) as a function of p describes the decreasing of global communication efficiency of the left network when the network is attacked by LAHBCA. As can be seen, although the communication efficiency of G l decreases faster than that of G r when facing NAHDA, its communication efficiency is the highest when the number of attacked nodes is less than 10%. On the contrary, when facing LAHBCA, the communication efficiency of G l is the highest.
D. Average Shortest Path Length
In MOEA-RSFMMA, the two objective functions mainly concern about the connectivity of networks and ignore the important average shorted path length, which is widely used and very important in real-world networks. Thus, we analyze the average shortest path length D(G) of the networks on the obtained Pareto fronts
Fig . 7 shows the changing of the average shortest path length of networks in the obtained Pareto fronts, where the results are normalized by their maximum values. As can be seen, the optimization of R D n sacrifices the average shortest path length. On the contrary, the enhancement of R BC l is positive correlated to the decreasing of the average shortest path length. According to these results, we should balance the robustness of networks with other functionality of networks, such as the average shortest path length, when a robust network structure is put into practice.
E. Assortative Coefficients
Assortativity is an important network feature which explains the correlation between properties of adjacent network nodes. Especially, the assortative can have a profound effect on the structural properties of a network. For example, assortative of a network by a discrete characteristic will tend to break the network up into separate communities [57] . Newman [58] defined the assortative coefficient of a network as the Pearson's correlation coefficients of degrees at either end of an edge
where k i is the degree of node i, and M is the total number of edges in the network. a ij is the value of the element in the adjacency matrix A ij , which is defined as Fig. 8 shows the changing of assortative coefficients of networks in the obtained Pareto fronts. As can be seen, the assortative coefficient is positively correlated to R D n without too many fluctuations when R D n is large. But when R D n is rather small, the assortative coefficient is fluctuating. This illustrates that, in the network with larger R D n , nodes with similar degree are more likely to be linked, which is well consistent with the recent study on the onion-like structure in [13] . Also, the results indicate that the relations between network robustness and assortative coefficient can be a very good guidance for designing optimization algorithms to improve network robustness, but the searching processing may be easily trapped in local optima due to the fluctuation in assortative coefficient when the value of R D n is low.
VI. EXPERIMENTS ON REAL-WORLD NETWORKS
In this section, we further validate the performance of MOEA-RSFMMA using two real-world networks as the initial network G 0 . The first one is the U.S.-Air network [59] , which has 332 nodes and 2126 edges, modeled from the real U.S. Air line network as nodes representing airports and edges representing airlines. The second one is the WU-PowerGrid network [60] , which has 217 nodes and 320 links, modeled from real West Europe as nodes representing generators, and links corresponding to high-voltage transmission lines between them. The parameters of MOEA-RSFMMA are the same to those in the above section.
First, the Pareto fronts obtained by MOEA-RSFMMA for these two networks are given in Fig. 9 . Also, the values of R D n and R BC l of the original networks are plotted in the same figure marked with a red star. As can be seen, the Pareto fronts are good in distribution and the robustness of these two networks are significantly improved.
Next, network topologies of original networks and G l , G m , and G r in the Pareto fronts are given in Fig. 10 . As can be seen, the significant improvement on robustness changes the network topologies dramatically. Being similar to the results for synthetic SFNs, from larger R BC l to larger R D n , the structure is converted from a random one into an onion-like one gradually.
The changing of the largest connected subgraph size is shown in Fig. 11 . This track is important because it gives a view of the connectivity of network under attacking. A network with high values of R D n or R BC l represents a well defending against NAHDA or LAHBCA. Thus, these two functions are important in guaranteeing the network's connectivity in different aspects. Next, the analyses in terms of the global communication efficiency are shown in Fig. 12 . As can be seen, the communication efficiency of G l is higher than that of G r at the beginning of NAHDA, and that of G l is always higher than that of G r under LAHBCA. In order to study the global properties of networks in the Pareto fronts, the normalized average shortest path length and the assortative coefficient are investigated in Figs. 13 and 14. As can be seen, from larger R D n to larger R BC l , the average shortest path length of these two networks has a decreasing tendency accompanied with fluctuations. In Fig. 14 , in order to have a clear understanding of the changing of assortative coefficients, the changing of robustness is plotted in the up-right part of the same picture because the robustness and the assortative coefficient are not in the same range. We can see that the changing tendency of the assortative coefficient with respect to the robustness is the same with the results on synthetic SFNs. The only difference lies in the fact that the assortative values of U.S.-Air network seem to be always negative, which means that the U.S.-Air network is always a disassortative network. 
VII. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING ALGORITHMS
Although no multiobjective algorithms were proposed to optimize network robustness against multiple malicious attacks, to illustrate the effectiveness of MOEA-RSFMMA, we conduct three sets of experiments. First, the performance of MOEA-RSFMMA is compared with that of an existing singleobjective optimization method optimizing each objective individually. Second, since MOEA/D [24] is another well-known MOEA, we replace NSGA-II by MOEA/D in the second phase of MOEA-RSFMMA to compare the difference of these two MOEAs in solving this problem. Third, to show the two objectives we select are appropriate, we use MOEA-RSFMMA to optimize the problems with three or four objectives, and compare the results with those of optimizing two objectives. The synthetic SFNs with 500 nodes and the above two real networks are used in the following experiments.
A. Comparison With Single-Objective Optimization Method
Since we model the problem of optimizing networks robustness against multiple malicious attacks as an MOP, to illustrate the advantage of this model, we use the single-objective heuristic method proposed in [13] to optimize R D n , R BC l , and (R D n + R BC l ) individually. According to the computational cost used by MOEA-RSFMMA, the NFFEs of this heuristic method is set to 4.0×10 4 when optimizing R D n , 1.0×10 4 when optimizing R BC l , and 1.0 × 10 4 when optimizing (R D n + R BC l ). The comparison between MOEA-RSFMMA and this heuristic method is shown in Fig. 15 . The results show that the networks obtained by this heuristic method when optimizing R D n , R BC l , and (R D n + R BC l ) are, respectively, close to the networks on the rightmost, middle, and leftmost parts of the Pareto front obtained by MOEA-RSFMMA. That is to say, in one run, the single-objective method can only find one network on the Pareto front since it can only optimize one objective.
B. Comparison With MOEA/D
In the R D n -R BC l -optimization phase of MOEA-RSFMMA, the framework of NSGA-II is used. In fact, other MOEA framework can also be used. In this experiment, we use the framework of another popular MOEA, MOEA/D [24] to realize this phase. The parameters are the same with those in Section V, and the mutation probability of MOEA/D is set to 0.8. The Pareto fronts obtained by MOEA-RSFMMA and MOEA-RSFMMA with MOEA/D are given in Fig. 16 . As can be seen, in general, MOEA-RSFMMA using NSGA-II outperforms Table I . At the level of 5%, we conclude that MOEA-RSFMMA significantly outperforms MOEA-RSFMMA with MOEA/D, which is consistent with the above observations.
C. Optimizing Three or Four Objectives
In this experiment, MOEA-RSFMMA is used to optimize three or four objectives, where two sets of three-objective are used, Furthermore, to statistically compare the performance of MOEA-RSFMMA in optimizing two-and three-objective (fourobjective), 30 independent runs of each case are conducted. Then, the comparison is performed in two directions. On the one hand, the obtained solutions of optimizing twoobjective are mapped to the corresponding three-objective (four-objective) space, and the HV is calculated and compared with that of the results optimizing three-objective (fourobjective). On the other hand, the obtained solutions of optimizing three-objective (four-objective) are mapped to the two-objective space, and the HV of the Pareto fronts is calculated and compared with that of the results optimizing two-objective. The comparison results are reported in Tables II-IV. As can be seen, the mean HV of optimizing three-objective (four-objective) is better than that of optimizing two-objective for the SFN with 500 nodes and the U.S.-Air network (but the Wilcoxon rank sum test results indicate that two cases are not significantly different), but worse for the WU-PowerGrid network. In general, the performance of MOEA-RSFMMA in optimizing two-objective and that of optimizing three-objective (four-objective) are similar, which confirms the above observations. Since optimizing two-objective is much easier than optimizing three-or four-objective, the former is a better choice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problem of improving the robustness of networks against multiple malicious attacks is first studied in depth and modeled as an MOP. Then, a two-phase multiobjective EA MOEA-RSFMMA is designed with the intrinsic properties of the objectives in mind. MOEA-RSFMMA can optimize the robustness of networks against both malicious node and link attacks. Moreover, the special two-phase optimizing pattern of MOEA-RSFMMA well balances the computational cost of the two objectives.
In the experiments, both synthetic and real-world networks are used to validate the performance of MOEA-RSFMMA, and a comparison is also made with existing algorithms. The results show that MOEA-RSFMMA can find good Pareto fronts effectively, and the networks in different parts of the Pareto fronts reflect different properties. The analyses in terms of largest connected subgraphs, communication efficiency, average shortest path length, and assortative coefficients are studied in depth for networks in different parts of Pareto fronts. The results show that the communicated efficiency is closely linked to the largest connected subgraph during the process of attacking. Second, the enhancement of R D n will have a tendency of improving the assortativity, but it companies with fluctuations when R D n is small. Last but not the least, the improvement of R D n sacrifices the average shortest path, while the enhancement of R BC l is not. These results indicate that when we optimize the robustness of networks, other functionalities of networks should be also taken into account according to practical applications.
